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Abstract

This paper develops a formal theory of store location within
shopping centers based on bid rent theory. The bid rent model
is fully specified and solved with the objective function of profit
maximization in the presence of comparative, multipurpose and
impulse shopping behavior. Several hypotheses result about the
optimal relationships between store types, sizes, rents, sales, and
distances from the mall center. The hypotheses are tested and
confirmed using data from a sample of 689 leases in eight
regional and super-regional shopping centers, suggesting that a
bid rent explanation is consistent with observed location patterns
in malls.

Since 1990 some interesting non-location studies on shopping centers have
explored the microeconomic foundations of lease price discrimination and store
space allocation (Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans, 1992; Brueckner, 1993; and
Pashigan and Gould, 1998). All of these studies are based on the concept of interstore externalities; thus, any expansion of these studies to include location aspects
would necessarily be based on agglomeration economies.
During the same timeframe, two applied circulation studies on customer traffic in
shopping centers suggested use of bid rent theory to explain the locational
characteristics of stores (Sim and Way, 1989; and Brown, 1991). Both articles
suggested that a bid rent-style model would appropriately describe customer
circulation in a regional or super-regional shopping center. A seminal working
paper in the economics tradition also suggested a bid rent foundation be used to
explain store location in shopping centers (Fisher and Yezer, 1993).
The current paper deals with the spatial aspects of shopping centers using bid rent
theory, leaving the more difficult aspects of agglomeration economies for others.1
What is important and novel is the treatment of inter-store location in the shopping
center in the context of urban spatial structure.
Pashigan and Gould (1998) suggest that the failure or inability to internalize
externalities contributed to the decline of the central business district (CBD) and
the rise of shopping centers. So shopping centers are worthy of study generally
if for no other reason than for the dramatic way they have reshaped retailing. Post-
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World-War II suburbanization, economic growth and mass ownership of the
automobile were necessary before shopping centers could thrive. But shopping
centers experienced a sudden dramatic rise in growth when developers became
convinced of the success of the enclosed mall concept in the late 1950s and early
1960s. By 1989, shopping centers captured 55.2% of all non-automotive retail
sales in the United States.
The goals of this article are to provide economic explanations for location patterns
of non-anchor stores in regional and non-regional shopping centers, relying on bid
rent theory to explain optimal store location. Several issues were immediately
recognized as complicating factors that needed to be dealt with. These included
(1) the fact that Alonso’s bid rent model operates only in perfectly competitive
markets and (2) the transportation costs of the bid rent model are absent in the
context of shopping centers.
This article proceeds as follows. First, the background literature on the shopping
center industry is presented, which is followed by a discussion of the formal bid
rent model as modified for a shopping center context. Next, testable hypotheses
regarding relative locations of stores by type, size, rent, and sales are proposed
for mall tenants that maximize profits for both tenants and the mall developer.
Hedonic equations based on Rosen (1974) are then estimated to determine the
economic impact of mall centers on store rent. The empirical tests employ a
shopping center database containing 849 observations. The empirical results then
provide strong support for the theory that stores’ location and size follow Alonso’s
basic bid rent pattern. Finally, concluding comments are presented.

兩

Industry Wisdom and the Nature of Shopping Centers

Since shopping centers internalize externalities through their leasing arrangements,
and the process reveals itself through rent discrimination and mall space allocation,
further manifestation of the process should be discoverable, including spatial
evidence.
The optimal decisions of the shopping center developer as the ‘‘perfectly
discriminating monopolist’’ should be revealed through other spatial
characteristics, particularly those related to store location. Characteristics of stores,
i.e., size, sales per square foot and rent per square foot, as they relate to location,
should be important. Secondarily, size, shape and general layout of shopping
centers place constraints on store location and therefore are also relevant to overall
store location.
Mall Configuration

The most common configuration for shopping centers is linear. Parking is provided
in the rear, at the sides, or in front. Commonly, most or all of the area around
regional or super-regional centers will be devoted to parking, unless a multi-level
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parking structure is provided for customer use.2 The presence of two anchor3
stores, each placed at an end of the center, is typically considered optimal so that
they will draw customer traffic through the center. A large linear center, such as
a regional center, will have separated anchors; for example, the principal anchor
in the middle with two smaller anchors at the ends (Darlow, 1972; Northern and
Haskoll, 1977; Beddington, 1982; Maitland, 1985; Brown, 1991; Mulvihill, 1992;
and ULI, 1999). Regional and super-regional centers almost always have a central
courtyard area reserved for food service, and this area is normally contained near
the center of the mall.
Large, regional and super-regional centers are more likely to be nonlinear in shape.
Comfortable walking distance between anchors in these centers is about 400 feet,
though some successful malls have had walking distances between anchors of 750
feet (ULI, 1999). An obvious reason for a non-linear layout for a center is to
make fullest use of a square site. Another reason for the use of non-linear shapes
is ‘‘to restrict the length of a center that would, if laid out in a straight line, be
too long.’’4
Typical mall widths range from 30 to 40 feet, although wider areas that are 60
feet or more in width can be introduced to serve as courts or other special areas.
One such area is the food court, which, according to the Urban Land Institute
(ULI, 1999), should be treated as an anchor tenant so it can draw people past
other shops. Its usual spot in the central area therefore puts the food court in a
very good location for this purpose.
S t o r e Va r i a t i o n s

Store sizes vary dramatically, from large anchor stores taking up 200,000 square
feet to kiosks, which are freestanding booths of 100 square feet or so placed in
the trafficked area of a mall. Store depth of regular tenants is said to vary from
40 to 120 feet; store width of regular tenants varies as widely as store size.
The industry literature emphasizes that store types tend to vary by gross sales
obtained per square foot, amount of rent paid per square foot and amount of space
occupied. The literature also emphasizes that close watch should be made to assure
tenants are not leased too much space. Certain tenant types should be leased so
much space and no more; otherwise they will obtain ‘‘insufficient sales to justify
the rent,’’ (Vernor and Rabianski, 1993:150).
Summary figures from Dollars and Cents of Shopping Centers show that both
sales and rent per square foot tend to decrease with store size and store types tend
to fit into distinct size ranges. The graphs in Exhibit 1 demonstrate sales/rent/
size relationships for regional and super-regional shopping centers—for both ULI
data and the database used in this study.
The graphs in Exhibit 1 show that merchandise types with smaller stores tend to
maintain higher sales per square foot, and vice versa. For instance, for regional
J R E R
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E x h i b i t 1 兩 Sales and Rent by Store Types
Panel A: Regional Centers

Sales & Rent by 17 Store Types (Median SF of Store Type on X Axis)
Regional Centers, ULI Data 1993
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Panel B: Super-Regional Centers

Sales & Rent by 17 Store Types (Median SF of Store Type on X Axis)
Super-Regional Centers, ULI Data 1993
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Source: Dollars & Cents of Shopping Centers: 1993, Washington, DC: ULI.
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E x h i b i t 1 兩 (continued)
Sales and Rent by Store Types
Panel C: Regional & Super-Regional Centers
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centers, both jewelry and ‘‘candy and nuts’’ stores had relatively high per square
foot sales, but maintained relatively small stores, while both women’s apparel and
toy stores had relatively low average per square foot sales but occupied larger
stores. In addition to diminishing returns (sales) to scale, the graphs also show
that rent tends to follow sales.
Two store location measures were deemed important and were mentioned in the
industry literature: (1) ‘‘main’’ aisles versus ‘‘side’’ aisles (ULI, 1999); and (2)
‘‘central’’ aisles versus ‘‘side’’ aisles (Stambaugh, 1978). A simple view for a
linear, regional mall would be that stores abutting the aisle between anchors
located on opposite ends of the mall are the main aisles, while stores abutting
aisles leading to exits are side aisles. Central aisles would be near the middle or
in the area of the entrance to the food court. Side aisles are more peripheral than
main aisles since exits are commonly some distance from the central area of the
mall.
The best high trafficked areas, then, are between the anchors, but toward the
middle—what professionals call ‘‘past the quarter point’’ of the length of the mall.
Food courts are high trafficked areas.
J R E R
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Measures of stores’ distances to the mall’s centers were made and added to the
database. Exhibit 2 graphs these measures. Generally, results show definite trends
for smaller store types to locate nearer mall centers and to generate higher sales
per square foot there. The square footage-distance relationship is less erratic than
the square footage-sales relationship.5
Industry literature is unanimous on the issue of anchors: anchors should be at
opposite ends of the mall and, in the case of more than two anchors, should be
equidistant from the center, the idea being that they draw shopper traffic through
the mall and past non-anchor tenants. High trafficked areas, like main aisles or
central aisles, should be reserved for impulse business, for instance fast food
restaurants. Areas less trafficked, like side aisles close to entrances or exits, should
be reserved for service tenants, such as banks, travel agencies, opticians, and dry
cleaners, because they are destination stores. [Unlike anchor stores, which are also
generally thought of as destination stores, service tenants are thought to have much
less spillover effect on other mall tenants’ sales. Drug stores and ‘‘high class’’
restaurants also fall into this category (ULI, 1999)].

兩

Application of Economic Theory to Optimal Store
Location
Generally

For bid rent theory, assume a shopping mall has a bounded linear region one unit
in length with anchor stores at each end. The mall is symmetric about its center
at distance t ⫽ 0. There are n types of mall tenants and each type of mall tenant
i has the following profit function:
Pi ⫽ pi ␣i ui(Ai) d(t) Ai ⫺ CFi ⫺ CMi Ai ⫺ CLi ␣i ui (Ai)
⫺ Coi ␣i ui(Ai) d(t)Ai ⫺ rAi,

(1)

where:
P
p
␣
A
ui(Ai)
d(t)
CFi
CMi

⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽

Total profit;
Price per unit of good sold;
Quantity of goods sold per purchasing customer visit;
Store area;
Proportion of customer traffic per unit store area that purchases;
Density of customer traffic as a function of distance t from the center;
Fixed costs unrelated to store area of sales volume (such as volume);
Quasi-fixed costs unrelated to sales volume per unit but dependent on
store area (i.e., maintenance, utilities, tenant finish-out);

S t o r e

L o c a t i o n

i n

S h o p p i n g

C e n t e r s

兩

2 4 3

E x h i b i t 2 兩 Store Distances to the Center of the Mall
Panel A: Sales / SF Distance to Mall Center

Sales/SF vs. Distance to Center (ft.) 11 Store Types (Average SF of Store Type on X Axis)
Database of Regional & Super-Regional Centers
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Panel B: Rent / SF Distance to Mall Center

Rent/SF vs. Distance to Center (ft.), 11 Store Types (Average SF of Store Type on X Axis)
Database of Regional & Super-Regional Centers
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CLi ⫽ Labor and operating costs, dependent both upon sales volume per unit
and store area;
Coi ⫽ Cost of goods sold, dependent both upon sales volume per unit area and
store area; and
r ⫽ Rent.6
The total number of purchases for a store area Ai and a given level of traffic
density, represented by the relationship ui(Ai)Ai exhibits decreasing returns to scale
(i.e., ⭸ui(Ai)Ai / ⭸Ai ⬎ 0 but ⭸2ui (Ai)Ai / ⭸A2i ⬍ 0). Thus stores have the incentive to
limit size to a level where marginal revenue from adding an additional square foot
of space is just offset by the marginal cost.
In terms of the profit function above, this is where (suppressing the subscript i):
⭸P/ ⭸A ⫽ 0 ⫽ ␣u(A) d(t)[p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co] ⫺ CM ⫺ r
⫹ A{␣d(t)[⭸u/ ⭸A] [p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co]}
⫽ ␣d(t)[p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co] [u(A) ⫹ A ⭸u/ ⭸A] ⫺ CM ⫺ r
⫽ ␣d(t)[p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co] ⭸[u(A)A]/ ⭸A ⫺ CM ⫺ r

or

⭸[u(A)A]/ ⭸A ⫽ (CM ⫹ r)/[p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co] ␣d(t)]. (2)

In addition to optimizing their consumption of space, store owners also want to
locate at a distance t from the center such that they can maximize their profit from
operations. In a competitive market, excess profits are bid away by increases in
land rent to the point where profit Pi ⫽ 0. In terms of the profit function, this is
where:
P ⫽ 0 ⫽ ␣u(A) Ad(t) [p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co] ⫺ CF ⫺ CM A ⫺ rA
or r ⫽ ␣u(A) d(t)[p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co] ⫺ CM ⫺ CF /A.

(3)

The relationships in Equations (1) and (2) may be combined to solve for the
optimal space consumption A* and rent schedule r* as a function of distance t
from the center. If u is assumed to be u(A)A ⫽ k1Ak2, where 0 ⬍ k2 ⬍ 1 represents
decreasing returns to scale, then:
⭸[u(A)A]/ ⭸A ⫽ k1k2Ak2⫺1 ⫽ (CM ⫹ r)/[(p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co) ␣d(t)]

and r ⫽ ␣k1 Ak2⫺1 d(t) [p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co] ⫺ CM ⫺ CF /A
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solving for A* yields:
A* ⫽ [CF / ␣d(t)k1 (p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co)(1 ⫺ k2)]1 / k2

(4)

and for r* yields:
r* ⫽ CF[k2 /(1 ⫺ k2)][␣k1(1 ⫺ k1) d(t)(p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co)/CF]1 / k2
⫺ CM ⫽ CF[k2 /(1 ⫺ k2)]/A* ⫺ CM.
(5)
The comparative statics results of Equation (4) demonstrate that optimal store area
A* decreases with increased density of customer traffic d(t). Hence stores decrease
in size as they locate closer to the mall center. Also, optimal store area A*
decreases in size with increase in price per unit of good sold, p. This accounts
for the relatively small size of jewelry stores and other luxury goods stores in the
mall. On the other hand, A* increases with increases in fixed costs (i.e., overhead,
CF, labor costs, CL, and costs of goods sold, Co). Further significant comparative
statics results with regard to Equation (3) are as follows: (1) A* decreases with
an increase in ␣, the quantity of goods sold per purchasing customer visit. All
other things being equal, destination/service stores like dry cleaners, banks and
shoe repairers need less space than other store types. (2) A* is independent of CM,
costs such as maintenance and utilities that are unrelated to sales volume per unit
area but dependent on store area.
The comparative statics results of Equation (5) demonstrate that optimal rent r*
increases with density of customer traffic d(t). Hence store rent is highest at the
center and drops off at a rate 1/k2 with customer density. Optimal rent r* increases
with an increase in price per unit of good sold, p (again an intuitive result in
luxury goods cases such as jewelry stores). This accounts for the relatively high
rents for jewelry stores in the mall. But r* decreases with increases in fixed costs.
So, all other things being equal, increased expenses lessen the amount of rent—
being a residual sum—that can be paid. And r* increases with increases in ␣, the
quantity of goods sold per purchasing customer visit. Other things being equal,
then, destination/service stores such as dry cleaners and banks pay higher rent—
the relatively lower rent paid by these stores will be predominantly due to lower
traffic density at those stores’ locations.
The relationship between r* and CM (costs such as maintenance and utilities,
unrelated to sales volume) is also inverse, as is the case with the relationship
between r* and CL, Co and CF. However, CM is a 1⬊1 relationship while other
costs vary at a rate 1/k2. Relationships between r* and d(t), p, CF, CL, Co and ␣
vary at a rate 1/k2. Thus CM, being unrelated to sales volume, varies at a different
rate with r* than do sales-related costs.
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It should be noted that certain conditions are assumed, which may limit the
applicability of the model. These include no inter-store externalities among tenants
that may affect densities of customer traffic and probabilities of sales in more
complex ways than under the model. There is perfect competition, i.e., tenants
bid for space and location in a way that maximizes their profits (reaching zero
profits in competition). Here the mall developer would not locate tenants in a way
that maximizes overall profit at the cost of reducing any individual store’s profits,
or reduces rents for an individual store below what would have existed in perfect
competition.7
Another assumption made here is that customer density d(t) is exogenous when
it in fact is endogenous to the location and size of tenants. This could be handled
by assuming an iterative process where a prior do(t) is assumed, locations are
allocated, and a new distribution d1(t) results. The process is repeated until it
converges at a stable distribution d*(t) in equilibrium. This distribution is assumed
to be known, a priori, and so the solution of the model represents a global
optimum, not an optimum for only a specific distribution of customer traffic
densities. The results would be affected only if d(t) were not downward sloping
with distance t from the center.
d(t) is Downward Sloping

There is significant evidence that d(t) is downward sloping. The customer
circulation study by Brown (1991) was particularly persuasive. The second
circulation study (Sim and Way, 1989) and the general observations of Fisher and
Yezer (1993) also showed the highest concentration of shoppers at the mall center
and the tapering off of shopper concentration toward the anchors.
This density distribution can also be demonstrated by simulating customer traffic
under a set of reasonable assumptions. Consider a linear shopping center with
anchors at either end that have w times the customer generating power of mall
tenants. Assume customers can enter the mall anywhere along its length and that
each customer makes n visits to stores, whether for comparison or multipurpose
shopping. Also assume these visits are random with respect to store type (i.e.,
store type has nothing to do with customer density along the mall).8
The probability of visiting a store is in proportion to its statistical customer
generating power shown in Exhibit 3 as relative customer traffic. Exhibit 3
provides the pattern of customer density (i.e., the probable average number of
customers passing by or visiting the store, for eight mall stores and two anchors,
with anchor customer generating power equal to twice that of a mall store. The
two anchors act as two additional mall tenants making for ten mall stores.) Note
that ⭸d(t)/ ⭸t ⬍ 0 and ⭸d 2(t)/ ⭸t2 ⬍ 0. Different customer visitation assumptions
will create different customer density relationships with distance from the mall
center (visits remaining random). The result in virtually every case is a downward
sloping customer density relationship with distance from the mall center.
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E x h i b i t 3 兩 Pattern of Customer Density

Simulation of Customer Traffic Along Linear Mall
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Competition among Stores for Location

So far a ‘‘closed city’’ bid rent model has been assumed for the location of stores
in a shopping mall. Competition among store types necessitates an ‘‘open city’’
model where not all tenant types may be able to locate in a mall. A tenant type
can be dominated by others to the extent that its bid rent curve is everywhere
below that of a competitor or competitors.
Exhibit 3 graphs a sampling distribution of 200 draws of three stores (sample
averages graphed). The parent population consists of twelve stores along a line as
follows: 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 10. The first two stores and the last two
stores (1,1 and 10, 10, respectively) represent two anchor stores, one at each of
the opposite ends of the mall. The rest are non-anchor stores. Possible sample
averages are: 1 ⫹ 1 ⫹ 1 ⫽ 3 ⫼ 3 ⫽ 1; 1 ⫹ 3 ⫹ 2 ⫽ 6 ⫼ 3 ⫽ 2; 3 ⫹ 5 ⫹ 10
⫽ 18 ⫼ 3 ⫽ 6. The simulation shows stores in the middle are more frequently
visited. Sampling distributions of 2000 or more draws of three stores will more
closely resemble normal distributions with thick tails.
Consider the above results for optimal space consumption and shape of the bid
rent relationship for tenants with different characteristics and what it would mean
for equilibrium of two or more tenant types. Following are the results from
J R E R
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differentiating the optimal bid rent relationship in Equations (4) and (5) with
respect to distance from the center (t):
⭸A*/ ⭸t ⫽ (⭸A*/ ⭸d*)(⭸d/ ⭸t) ⫽ ⫺A* (⭸d/ ⭸t)(t/d)(1/t)
⫽ ⫺(A*/t)(⭸d/ ⭸t)(t/d)

((⭸d/ ⭸t)(t/d) ⫽ elasticity of d with respect to t).

(6)

⭸r*/ ⭸t ⫽ (⭸r*/ ⭸d)(⭸d/ ⭸t) ⫽ (⫺CFK2)/(1 ⫺ K2)A*2

(⫺A/d)(⭸d/ ⭸t)(1/d)
⫽ (⫺CFK2)/(1 ⫺ K2)A* (⭸d/ ⭸t)(1/d)
⫽ ⫺CFK2 /(1 ⫺ K2)A*2 (⭸A*/ ⭸t).

(7)

Let ⌫ ⫽ ⫺CF K2 /(1 ⫺ K2)/A*2 (⭸A*2 / ⭸t), and the store types in the shopping
center ⌫1, ⌫2, ⌫3, . . . ⌫n. If ⌫1 ⬎ ⌫2, then it implies store type ⌫1 will have higher
rent. Also, ⭸2r/ ⭸t2 ⬍ 0 and the rent gradient for ⌫1 will be steeper than for ⌫2.9
Store types with high sales response to customer traffic, high-priced goods and
lower costs (or high margins) will tend to have smaller stores and to locate close
to the mall center, since they are able to bid the higher rent per square foot for
the right and have the steepest bid rent curves. These store types include jewelry
stores (high price per item) and the food court (high sales response to customer
traffic). Those at the other extreme of sales response to density, with lower-priced
goods relative to their costs (lower margins), will tend to locate at the periphery,
near the anchors. Examples here would include family apparel and house-wares.
The point of indifference between two store types would be the distance at which
the rent for one store type equals that for the other type, or where r*1 ⫽ r*.
2
From Equation (5), to solve the relationship for the point of transition t*:
r* ⫽ R ⫽ CF[k2 /(1 ⫺ k2)][␣k1 (1 ⫺ k2)
d(t) (p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co)/CF]1 / k2 ⫺ CM
⫽ CF[k2 /(1 ⫺ k2)]/A* ⫺ CM
⫽ (CF /1 ⫺ k2)(k2⫹1 / k2) k2(␣d(t)k1 (p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co))1 / k2 ⫺ CM. (8)

Hence, R(t)(i) ⫽ (t) ⌫ 1i / k2 ⫺ CM, where (t) ⫽ (CF /1 ⫺ k2)(k2⫹1 / k2) k2 (␣d(t)k1
(p ⫺ CL ⫺ Co)) and ⌫i denote store types, as before.
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Choosing ⌫1 ⬎ ⌫2, then R(t)1 ⫽ R(t)2 ⫽ (t) [⌫ 11 / k2 ⫺ ⌫ 12 / k2]. This result holds for
all variables in A*, except k2, CM and CF. The k2 parameter is interpreted as being
different for store types and so a separating equilibrium occurs. The k2 parameter
is the proportion of customer traffic per unit store area that purchases.
Differentiating store types this way creates bid rent equlibria. Stores more sensitive
to customer volume go to the center and those not so sensitive locate at the
periphery.

兩

E m p i r i c a l Te s t s o f t h e B i d R e n t M o d e l o f S t o r e L o c a t i o n

According to the relationships in Equations (4) and (5) (between equilibrium rent
and store size and distance from the mall center for various characteristics), the
following models are suggested:10
Rent (r) ⫽ ƒ(pi, ␣i, Ai, ui(Ai), d(t), CLi, Coi, CFi, CMi),

(9)

where:
⭸r/ ⭸t ⬍ 0, ⭸r/ ⭸d(t) ⬎ 0, ⭸r/ ⭸CL, Co ⬎ 0, ⭸r/ ⭸CF & CM ⫽ 0, ⭸r/ ⭸p ⬎ 0, and
⭸r/ ⭸␣ ⬎ 0, and where it is assumed ui(Ai)Ai ⫽ ki Aik2, where 0 ⬍ k2 ⬍ 1

(representing decreasing returns to scale).
Store Size (A) ⫽ ƒ(pi, ␣i, Ai, ui(Ai), d(t), CLi, Coi, CFi, CMi),

(10)

where:
⭸A/ ⭸t ⬎ 0, ⭸A/ ⭸d(t) ⬍ 0, ⭸A/ ⭸CL, Co, CM ⬎ 0, ⭸A/ ⭸CF ⫽ 0,
⭸A/ ⭸p ⬍ 0 and ⭸A/ ⭸␣ ⬍ 0, where it is assumed ui(Ai)Ai ⫽ ki Aik2, where 0 ⬍ k2
⬍ 1 (representing decreasing returns to scale).

These models were estimated using collected data from the database. The
following regression analysis empirically examined hypotheses derived from the
bid rent model.

兩

Hypotheses

1. Non-anchor store total rents and sales per square foot will decline with
distance from the mall center for stores generally; non-anchor store total
rents per square foot will decline at different rates by store type with
distance from the mall center.
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2. Non-anchor store size will increase with distance from the mall center,
both for stores generally and by the same rate for store the same types.
The Shopping Center Database

Tenant, lease and location data of non-anchor mall stores from nine regional and
super-regional shopping centers located throughout the United States were
supplied by two sources that required confidentiality. One thousand and twelve
non-anchor tenants doing business in 1991 and 1992 were studied. Geographic
diversity of the centers was as follows: Pacific (2) (San Francisco MSA; Los
Angeles–Long Beach MSA); West North Central (1) (Minneapolis–St. Paul
MSA); East North Central (1) (Chicago MSA); Southeast (2) (Memphis MSA;
Miami MSA); Northeast (3) (Philadelphia MSA (2); Hartford MSA). All centers
were enclosed, of contemporary design, comparable in amenities and occupancy
(near 100%) and competitive within the markets they served. They differed in size
from 503,600 to 1,004,000 square feet of gross leasable area. Six centers were
single level, two had two levels and one had three levels.
Exhibits 4 and 5 set out descriptive statistics for the sample—for all the stores
and by standard store types.11 Sales for non-anchor stores ranged from $34 per
E x h i b i t 4 兩 Store Characteristics

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Square Feet (SF)

2,395

2,213

120

27,000

361

217

34

1,632

Sales per Square Foot ($ / SF)
Total Rent per Sq. Ft. ($ / SF)

36.64

25.17

5.83

277

E x h i b i t 5 兩 Characteristics by Selected Store Type

Variable

Store Type

Observation Frequency

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

SF
SF
SF
SF

Gifts
Women’s shoes
Women’s apparel
Jewelry

6.5%
5%
18%
6.2%

2,088
1,750
3,907
1,301

1,750
1,003
2,475
648

665
1,000
569
472

5,475
6,437
13,915
4,278

SALES $ / SF
SALES
SALES
SALES

Gifts
Women’s shoes
Women’s apparel
Jewelry

299
304
258
676

123
117
113
276

136
84
90
213

711
566
751
1,433

TRNT $/SF
TRNT
TRNT
TRNT

Gifts
Women’s shoes
Women’s apparel
Jewelry

31
32
28
60

12
10
17
27

16
12
6
17

64
51
77
127
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square foot per year for a minor anchor store to $1,632 per square foot per year
for a kiosk (a freestanding booth located in a main aisle). Differences in sales per
square foot between malls seemed to depend on customer income in the market
area [e.g., downtown San Francisco (highest) versus Memphis (lowest)]. Vacancy
averaged 3.1% and was not a problem for any mall. Overall, national chain stores
(businesses having stores located in at least a couple of states with a common
name) made up 67% of the database, while local tenants (businesses originating
from nearby) made up 37%.
The data used in the empirical model represent 689 observations from eight of
the malls, the triple-level mall being excluded because of difficulties in measuring
location variables. Some lease data was deemed unusable and was excluded for
one or more reasons. Mall stores were differentiated by length of lease, percentage
and base rent, and location characteristics, including distance from the mall’s
center, as well as size and annual sales and rent per square foot.
Distance measures were the shortest walking distances to and from a mall’s center
and to and from the center point of each store’s front side. A common definition
for a mall’s ‘‘center’’ was needed as was a normalization process by which
distance measures between mall shops could be compared. A common sense
definition of mall ‘‘center’’ was adopted borrowing from urban economic studies
that located center points of metropolitan areas (e.g., Hohnson and Ragas, 1987;
Pieser, 1987; Ihlanfeldt and Raper, 1990; and Coulson, 1991). Spatial patterns of
mall store sales, rents and square footage was also viewed for each of the centers
as part of the process.
Normalizing was conducted by dividing the distance measure by the square root
of the mall area (non-anchor store area plus aisle and court areas). Significant
differences in mall areas existed. Use of the same normalization procedure for all
eight malls was deemed appropriate since three quarters of the malls had the same
basic ‘‘I’’ shape.
Te s t s o f H y p o t h e s e s

Consistent with bid rent theory, rents and size are assumed to be related to distance
from the mall center (DISTANCE). Other tenant (TENANT) and (LEASE) variables
shown in the literature to effect rent and size were added (CHN, TERM, SF and
SF2), as were tenant (TENANT) and location (LOCATION) variables hypothesized
to be related to rent and size (COMP, EXIT, SAME and VACA). Rents and size
are therefore assumed to be related to the four factor types DISTANCE, TENANT,
LEASE and LOCATION, where RENTji is measured on a per square foot basis for
shopping center j during the ith time period.
RENTji ⫽ ƒ(DISTANCEj, TENANTj, LEASEj, LOCATIONj). (11)
SIZEji ⫽ ƒ(DISTANCEj, TENANTj, LEASEj, LOCATIONj).
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The ordinary least squares (OLS) equations are estimated in the semi-log form12
for two models, and tests are made for heteroscedasticity following White (1980).
The hypothesis that regression errors are homoscedastic is rejected for each of the
equations (i.e., p-values less than .025), indicating weighted least squares (WLS)
is appropriate. Examination of plots of residual errors of the independent variables
shows that error variance is related to effective purchasing power of the market
area of each shoppingcenter.13
Multicollinearity among individual variables of the regression equations was not
a problem.14 Heteroscedasticity was eliminated after application of WLS
regression to the models.15 R-square typically rises after application of WLS.
Individual Stores, Rent and Size

Research on determinants of mall store rents has been undertaken by Benjamin,
Boyle and Sirmans in two articles (1990, 1992). Borrowing from their research,
and adding location and other variables, two semi-log empirical models were
estimated regressing non-anchor store rents and size in square feet on tenant, lease
and location characteristics, as follows:

ln TRNTi ⫽ ␣o ⫹ ␤1CHNi ⫹ ␤2SFi ⫹ ␤3SF2i ⫹ ␤4TERMi
⫹ ␤5COMPi ⫹ ␤6SAMEi ⫹ ␤7CENTERi ⫹ ␤8VACAi
⫹ ␤9LOCATIONi ⫹ ei.

(13)

lnSFi ⫽ ␣o ⫹ ␤1CHNi ⫹ ␤2TERMi ⫹ ␤3COMPi ⫹ ␤4EXITi
⫹ ␤5SAMEi ⫹ ␤6CENTERi ⫹ ␤7VACAi ⫹ ␤8TRNTi
⫹ ␤9LOCATIONi ⫹ ei.

(14)

Where:
TRNT:
CHN:
SF:
SF2:
TERM:
COMP:
SAME:
CENTER:

Total rent;
A dummy variable ⫽ 1 if a tenant is a member of a national or
regional chain, 0 otherwise;
Size in square feet;
Square feet squared;
Length of lease;
A dummy variable ⫽ 1 if a tenant is a comparison of shopping
store type, 0 otherwise;
Feet distance to the nearest same type store;
Feet distance to mall center;
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VACA:
Feet distance to nearest vacant store;
EXIT:
Feet distance to nearest exit; and
LOCATION: Location dummy.
Following Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans (1992), Guidry and Sirmans (1993) and
Gatzlaff, Sirmans and Diskin (1994), dummy variables for location (LOCATION)
were added to capture location characteristics of the malls.
SF, SF2, TERM and CHN were independent variables used in regression models
estimated in Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans (1992). Following that study, SF was
added as an independent variable to allow for economics of scale in leasing space
to tenants large amounts of space; SF2 was added because the effects of economies
was not linear but decreased at a decreasing rate. According to Benjamin, Boyle
and Sirmans (1992), tenants belonging to a national or regional chain (CHN) were
likely to generate higher sales and pay less rent. Additionally, tenants with longer
lease terms (TERM) were likely to pay lower rents. Lower rent in these instances
may represent a landlord’s discount for lower default probability or greater tenant
bargaining power. Higher sales result from name recognition of national and
regional claims by consumers.
COMP was a dummy variable for comparison shopping store type. Eppli and
Shilling (1995) hypothesized (but could not prove) that comparison stores were a
second source of customer traffic generation for shopping centers (in addition to
anchors) (see also, Mejia and Eppli, 2003). The most obvious comparison store
types were chosen using a database supplied by Stillerman, Jones and Co.16
Comparison stores were men’s apparel, jewelry, and men’s and women’s shoe
stores.
Nearest distance to: (1) the mall center (CENTER); (2) a vacant store (VACA);
and (3) the nearest same type store (SAME) were measured for all malls.17
Distances were measured as shortest walking distances within malls. SAME and
VACA were added as location variables to pick up variations in sales and rents
based on clustering/dispersion of store types and negative externalities associated
with vacant stores, respectively.18
Multiple regression results using TRNT and SF as dependent variables are
summarized in Exhibits 6 and 7, respectively. The effects of distance from the
shopping mall’s center (CENTER) on total rents per square foot (TRNT) are
negative and significant; the effects of distance from the mall’s center on store
size (SF) is positive and significant. This is consistent with the expectations of a
bid rent process. Non-anchor stores successfully bidding for location have higher
rents the closer they locate to the mall’s center. An approximate 4% increase in
rents is expected for every 100 feet closer to the mall’s center a store locates.19
As expected, factor substitution occurs and square footage of stores (SF) increases
significantly at a decreasing rate (SF2), with increases in rents.20 CHN was
insignificant in the TRNT regression, and so does not contradict the finding of
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E x h i b i t 6 兩 Non-anchor Store Total Rent per Square Foot Regressed on Distance, Tenant Lease and Location
Characteristics (semi-log functional form; weighted)

Variable

Coefficient

Intercept

4.0884

CHN
SF
SF2
TERM
COMP
EXIT
SAME

Prob.

Variance Inflation

54.315

0.0001

0.0000

0.0167

0.504

0.6147

1.0950

⫺0.0001

⫺13.285

0.0001

7.7037

0.0219E-7

T-Ratio

6.349

0.0017

1.1717

⫺0.517

0.6053

1.0934

0.0026

0.070

0.9442

1.1589

⫺0.0002

⫺1.815

0.0700

1.2744

⫺0.0298

0.0002

1.232

0.2183

1.5860

CENTER a

⫺0.2436

⫺5.315

0.0001

1.4146

VACA

⫺0.0003

⫺2.255

0.0245

1.4336

Mall Dummy Variablesb

0.5544
⫺0.3904
⫺0.0804
⫺0.5443
⫺0.3863
⫺0.1769
⫺0.3814
⫺0.2672

10.104
⫺6.586
⫺1.465
⫺9.120
⫺5.816
2.986
⫺6.340
⫺4.912

0.0001
0.0001
0.1433
0.0001
0.0001
0.0029
0.0001
0.0001

2.1544
2.0544
2.0204
2.0705
2.0810
2.5006
2.0302
2.0262

Note: N ⫽ 689; Adj. R2 ⫽ .6804; and F-Value ⫽ 92.555.
a
Normalized
b
Locational dummies

Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans (1992) that chain stores generally have better credit
and receive a rent discount from landlords for lower default probability. A positive
significant coefficient for CHN in the SF regression is of course expected.
TERM was negative and significant in the TRNT regression and positive and
significant in the SF regression. According to Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans
(1992), this finding suggests longer leases may be appropriate. Thus, larger stores
farther from the mall center would reasonably be more likely to have longer leases.
SAME was negative and insignificant in both the TRNT and SF regressions. VACA
was negative and insignificant in the TRNT regression and insignificant in the SF
regression. COMP and EXIT were both positive and insignificant in both
regressions (although EXIT was significant at the 10% level).
Regression results of these last four variables suggest two processes. Significant
results for VACA and EXIT (at the 10% level) reflect lower rent levels and larger
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E x h i b i t 7 兩 Non-anchor Store Size per Square Foot Regressed on Distance, Tenant Lease and Location
Characteristics (semi-log functional form; weighted)

Variable

Coefficient

T-Ratio

Prob.

Variance Inflation

Intercept

7.7451

54.168

0.0001

0.0000

CHN

0.3445

6.462

0.0001

1.0810

TERM

0.0019

3.153

0.0017

1.1717

⫺0.0298

⫺0.517

0.6053

1.0934

EXIT

0.0003

1.773

0.0767

1.2478

SAME

0.0002

⫺0.766

0.4438

1.1520

CENTER a

0.1931

3.478

0.0005

1.6223

VACA

⫺0.0003

⫺1.364

0.1729

1.4785

Mall Dummy Variablesb

⫺0.0321
⫺0.1869
⫺0.0517
⫺0.1339
⫺0.3786
0.0587
⫺0.0188
⫺0.2474

⫺0.348
⫺1.907
⫺0.567
⫺1.195
⫺3.542
0.562
⫺0.175
⫺4.238

0.7280
0.0569
0.5711
0.2324
0.0004
0.5746
0.8611
0.0001

2.1058
1.9217
1.9509
1.7950
2.0810
2.5006
2.0302
1.9182

COMP

Note: N ⫽ 689; Adj. R2 ⫽ .3573; and F-Value ⫽ 24.901.
a
Normalized
b
Locational dummies

stores with distance from mall centers (vacancies are more plentiful at the
peripheries). Results of COMP and SAME show a lack of overall clustering among
stores of the same type.21
S t o r e Ty p e s

The bid rent model developed here is further illustrated by focusing on store types
rather than individual stores (i.e., Alonso’s ‘‘families of bid rent curves’’). Readily
noticeable are the following: (1) different rates at which store type rents decline
with distance from the mall center; (2) different intercepts at which store type
rents begin to decline; and (3) a constant factor-substitution-generated rate of
increase in the size of store types with distance from the mall center.
Rents. Rents per square foot were regressed against stores’ (normalized) distances
from the mall center and the store type dummies to measure how rents per square
foot for store types varied with distance from the center. Results are reported in
Exhibit 8. Exhibit 9 is a graph of the response curves representing average rents
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E x h i b i t 8 兩 Rent Variation by Store Type with Distance from Center

Type of Store

Coefficient

Rent at Center / SF

T-Ratio

Prob.

⫺4.901

0.0001

Family Apparel

⫺18.36

$46.37

⫺3.460

0.0006

Men’s Apparel

⫺24.66

$49.07

⫺3.727

0.0002

Leisure & Entertainment

⫺17.83

$46.91

⫺4.743

0.0001

Housewares

⫺27.15

$37.58

⫺5.447

0.0001

Men’s Shoes

⫺28.23

$36.50

⫺4.521

0.0001

Women’s Shoes

⫺23.74

$40.99

⫺3.758

0.0002

Specialty Food

⫺13.60

$51.14

⫺2.610

0.0093

CENTER

Jewelry

0.0556

10.45

$75.18

1.835

0.0670

Cards & Gifts

⫺27.14

$37.59

⫺4.380

0.0001

Women’s Apparel

⫺34.92

$29.81

CENTER * Family Apparel

0.0299

⫺8.881

0.0001

⫺1.746

0.0814

CENTER * Men’s Apparel

0.0385

1.921

0.0552

CENTER * Leisure & Ent.

0.0347

2.611

0.0093

CENTER * Housewares

0.0468

2.934

0.0035

CENTER * Men’s Shoes

0.0471

2.676

0.0076

CENTER * Women’s Shoes

0.0321

1.495

0.1354

CENTER * Specialty Food

0.0409

2.384

0.0174

CENTER * Jewelry

0.0281

1.443

0.1496

CENTER * Cards & Gifts

0.0510

2.821

0.0050

CENTER * Women’s App.

0.0534

4.254

0.0001

Note: Model included the same dummy variables used in the first two models to control for intercenter variations. Most were significant. N ⫽ 689; R2 ⫽ .4468; Adj. R2 ⫽ .4216; and F-Value ⫽
17.681.

of store types with distance from the mall center.22 The curves reflect average rent
paid by store types at various distances from the mall center. Store types paying
rent at the center have steeper response curves and vice versa.
Size. To measure how square footage for store types varies with distance from the
mall center, square footage was regressed against store (normalized) distance to
the center and the store type dummies. Results are reported in Exhibit 10.23 A
graph of these response curves, representing average square footage by store type
with distance to the mall center, is presented in Exhibit 11. The response curves
indicate how store types expand and contract with changes in location relative to
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E x h i b i t 9 兩 Average Rents of Store Types with Distance from the Mall Center

E x h i b i t 10 兩 Size Variation by Store Type with Distance from Center

Type of Store

Coefficient

T-Ratio

Prob.

666.75

68.339

0.0001

2.927

0.0035

Family Apparel

2,132.22

10.264

0.0001

Men’s Apparel

1,673.43

7.641

0.0001

Leisure & Entertainment

1,593.14

9.251

0.0001

Intercept (Fast Food)
CENTER

Size (SF) at Center

1.0004

Housewares

1,438.47

6.403

0.0001

Men’s Shoes

1,702.73

7.967

0.0001

Women’s Shoes

1,391.80

5.526

0.0001

931.54

2.828

0.0043

Specialty Food
Jewelry

932.44

2.862

0.0043

Cards & Gifts

1,512.95

7.018

0.0001

Women’s Apparel

2,720.31

15.121

0.0001

Note: Model included the same dummy variables used in the first two models to control for intercenter variations. Most were significant. N ⫽ 689; R2 ⫽ .3461; Adj. R2 ⫽ .3303; and F-Value ⫽
21.922.
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E x h i b i t 11 兩 Average Square Footage by Store Type with Distance to the Mall Center

the mall center. The slopes are positive and constant, so all store types can be
expected to increase in size at about the same rate with distance from the mall
center.

兩

Conclusion

Alonso’s (1964) original model of firm location considered both business volume
and transportation costs in determining location relative to a city center. Here
business volume is a function of customer traffic density, and there are no
transportation costs. Stores (firms) can increase sales depending on such
parameters as quantity of goods sold per purchasing customer visit (␣), price per
unit of good sold (p) and proportion of customer traffic per unit store area that
purchases (u(A)). Costs are both fixed (unrelated to both sales volume and areas)
and variable (varying with both area and sales volume).
The shopping center model depends on a downward sloping customer density
function (d(t)) from the mall center. Empirical evidence from customer circulation
studies and the general observations of Fisher and Yezer (1993) both support this
requirement. Competition for store location was demonstrated theoretically for
both ‘‘closed’’ city and ‘‘open’’ city models. Store area and proximity to the mall
center were shown to be affected by such parameters as sales response to customer
density (u(A)), price of goods (p), low cost (or high margins) and quantity of
goods sold per purchasing visit (␣).
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Store types such as jewelry stores, food court, family apparel and housewares are
shown to fit the results of the model well. Rents and rent gradients are shown to
vary to demonstrate the bid rent process among store types. Also distances from
the mall center are shown to vary by store type.
Insights into the theory can be applied to examine a problem that landlords
routinely face, namely, how to fill a vacancy in a shopping center. In particular,
we ask whether the landlord should add an additional outlet of one store type or
another. This will depend on the stores’ bid rent characteristics and distance from
the mall center, especially its ⭸A*/ ⭸t and ⭸r*/ ⭸t. Whichever alternative store type
fits best will take the location. Since an ‘‘open’’ city context is used here, certain
stores seeking to fill a vacancy may not be proper contenders for the spot.
The study confirms that non-anchor stores in a shopping center behave similarly
to urban firms in a CBD. The process in the CBD is one of tradeoff between the
desire for space and recognition of commuting (or transportation) costs (or
distance from the mall center). In shopping centers it is the recognition of
customer density effects on sales and costs that is important. Regressions indicate
that total rents and store size for mall stores with respect to the mall center behave
just as they do for urban firms with respect to distance from a city center. This
was shown for both individual and market equlibria.
Future research should concentrate on refining the mechanism on just how
shopping center space pricing and allocation operates in a perfectly competitive
environment. Shopping centers provide an excellent example of Coase’s Theorem
that should be further studied. Although seemingly consistent with bid rent theory,
future effort should examine expectations derived from agglomeration theory and
the interaction of agglomeration theory with bid rent theory. Empirical tests of
the bid rent model for shopping centers could use some improvement. Finally,
some improvements in data measurement and methodology should also be
considered.

兩

Endnotes
1

According to Arnott, Anas and Small (1998:1451):
‘‘Agglomeration economies have resisted attempts to fully understand their
microfoundations. This is illustrated by urban economists’ lack of confidence
in forecasting the effects of the communications revolution on urban spatial
structure. On the theoretical side, we do not know the scale at which the
various forces work or what kinds of equilibria the simultaneous interaction
of many forces will produce, nor do we have reliable models of dynamic
growth paths and random shocks. We also do not know which external
economies will be internalized through private initiative. On the empirical
side, despite the increasing sophistication of studies relating a firm’s
productivity to the size and industrial composition of the city in which it is
located, we do not know the specific forces that produce these relationships,
or just how the depend on industry mix, local public goods, or zoning.’’
J R E R

兩

Vo l .

2 7

兩

N o .

3 – 2 0 0 5

2 6 0

2

3

4

5

6

兩

C a r t e r

a n d

Va n d e l l

Regional shopping centers in the U.S. range in size from 300,000 to 900,000 square
feet of gross leasable area (GLA). Customer driving time for goods and services at
regional centers is about 20 minutes; market areas extend about eight miles around the
center and serve populations of more than 150,000. Super-regional centers are larger in
GLA and serve a larger population (ULI, 1999: 8–11).
‘‘Anchor’’ stores are most often large department stores, such as Sears, J.C. Penney,
Dillard’s, or Nordstrom in the U.S. There are always anchors for regional and superregional centers. Other classifications of tenants can be anchors, especially for other
types of malls (ULI, 1999). The International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) lists
anchors as national mass merchandise stores, conventional department stores, discount
department stores and other types of anchors (ICSC, 1992). The basic idea is that anchor
stores have customer drawing power. They are most often destinations for customers
coming to the mall (Kimball, 1991).
Nothing considered to be a representative inventory has ever been taken of shopping
mall shapes. In his doctoral dissertation, Eppli (1992) collected shopping center data on
54 regional and super-regional centers. Of these 54 centers, 17 (31%) were linear, 16
(29%) were a ‘‘T’’ design, 15 (28%) were an ‘‘X’’ design and 6 (12%) were an ‘‘L’’
design.
The shopping center database describes how mall centers were located and how center
distance measures were calculated.
Part of this model was set out in Carter and Haloupek (2000: 38-39). The intent here
is to give detailed explanations of how Alonso’s (1964)model and the model proposed
here differ. Alonso’s theory of the firm was developed using businesses in a city where
land use is a function of the tradeoffs between desire for space and costs of commuting
or transport. The city in which firms locate is a circular CBD where jobs are located.
Arnott, Anas and Small (1998) describe basic assumptions: ‘‘Land use in the simple
monocentric model is efficient—that is, the equilibrium density pattern is Pareto optimal
(Mirrles, 1972; and Fujita, 1989). This is basically because there are no externalities;
land-use decisions are based on tradeoffs between desire for space and recognition of
commuting costs, both of which are purely private. The need for commuting is
exogenous in the model, so no agglomeration effects are present. Of course, these nice
properties disappear in more realistic models with congestion, air pollution,
neighborhood quality effects, and economies of agglomeration. . . .’’
Firms in the city maximize profits with respect to quantity of goods produced and
sold and location. Derivation of the bid rent curve for individual firms follows a profit
maximizing objective function. Profits remain after operating costs and rent are paid
from the revenues of business volume:

⌸ ⫽ V ⫺ C ⫺ R, where ⌸ ⫽ profits; V
⫽ volume of business (revenue); C ⫽ operating costs; and R ⫽ rent.

But in a profit maximizing equilibrium, where firms have zero economic profits, ⌸
⫽ 0 and R ⫽ V ⫺ C. Business volume, V, depends on location, t, and size of the site,
q, i.e., C ⫽ C(V, t, q). Rent is determined by site size, q, times site rent at that location,
P(t) (i.e., R ⫽ P(t)q).
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As distance from the city center increases, revenue from sales volume decreases at
an increasing rate (i.e., the revenue function is convex from below). Overall operating
expenses consist primarily of transportation costs that increase with distance from the
city center. Operating costs are also affected to a lesser extent negatively because sales
volume decreases with distance from the city center. Since revenue decreases and
operating costs increases with distance, rent (bid rent) must decrease for the level of
profits to remain constant (R ⬎ 0; ⌸ ⫽ 0 ⫽ V ⫺ C ⫺ R; R ⫽ V ⫺ C). The negative
slope of a firm’s bid rent curve is:

dp/dt ⫽ (Vt ⫺ CvVt ⫺ Ct)/q,

7
8

9
10

11

12

where Vt is the marginal revenue lost from moving an additional distance dt away from
the center; CvVt is the indirect decrease in operating costs arising from the decrease in
the volume of sales; Ct is the marginal increase in operating costs arising directly from
movement dt; and p is the real bid by a firm at each location, t; Vt is negative and Ct
is positive, but Ct preceded by a minus sign is negative. CvVt is negative, but preceded
by a minus sign is positive. CvVt is the decrease in operating expenses accompanying
a decrease in volume and is less than the sales volume decrease (i.e., Vt ⬎ CvVt). Change
in the real bid is equal to the change in the business volume less the changes in operating
costs, divided by the unit of size so as to obtain a per-unit-of-land figure. The slope is
such that savings in rent are equal to business lost plus increasing costs. Textbook
examples often assume revenue will be the same throughout the city and bid rent curves
are negatively sloped only because transportation costs increase with distance to the city
center (e.g., DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1996: Chapter 3; and O’Sullivan, 2003: Chapter
8).
A result, of course, that would not make sense without Coase’s Theorem.
Customer travel costs between stores are considered negligible so distances between
stores are not important. But costs incurred in ‘‘sampling,’’ looking over and choosing
goods at stores limits visits/purchases by customers. The simulation set out in Exhibit
3 assumes three stores per visit. Three stores per visit would seem a reasonable average.
Stillerman, Jones and Company (1994) reports an average of three store visits per
shopping trip for their survey sample of shopping centers.
Note that K2 as well as the cost elements are store-specific.
Pursuant to the last section, revenue or sales (p␣d(t)u(A)A) is a function of price (p),
customer density at some distance from the center (d(t)), proportion of customer traffic
per store area that purchases (u(A)) and quantity of goods sold per purchase (␣). Two
types of costs vary with sales (CL and Co), and one is unrelated to either sales or area
(CF).
The eleven store type categories into which all stores were divided are similar to those
used by the Urban Land Institute (1993) and Eppli and Shilling (1995): jewelry, cards
and gifts, women’s apparel (including women’s accessories), fast food, family apparel,
men’s apparel, leisure and entertainment, housewares, men’s and boy’s shoes, and
specialty food.
This is consistent with the use of the semi-log form of in urban economic research, such
as the negative exponential density functions used by Muth (1969) and Mills (1972) to
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describe how population density declines (i.e., at a decreasing rate with distance from
a city center).
The function is, generally, for any variable V, V ⫽ Voe⫺⌫u, where u ⫽ distance and
⌫ describes the slope of the curve. Taking logs, lnV ⫽ lnVo ⫺ ⌫u, 0 ⬍ ⌫ ⬍ 1 (e.g., ⌫
⫽ 0.9 denotes a steeper curve than ⌫ ⫽ 0.2).
Kennedy (1981) showed that estimation using a semi-log functional form with dummy
variables results in a degree of bias in the estimated coefficients. In the present case,
the adjustments suggested by Kennedy did not lead to changes that were economically
meaningful.
The last three models are estimated using the linear form for convenience in making
calculations.
Heteroscedasticity often arises in the context of hedonic pricing models for residences
when separate models are not developed for neighborhoods. A wilder variance for the
error term results for higher priced properties that tend to sell over a broader range of
independent variables (i.e., square footage, number of bathrooms, etc.) than low priced
properties.
In the instant case, heteroscedasticity is a problem for much the same reason. Tenants
with high rents and sales exist over a broader range of independent variable
characteristics than tenants with low rent and sales. A shopping center in San Francisco
is the equivalent of a house in an upper class neighborhood, while a shopping center in
Memphis is the equivalent of a house in a lower class neighborhood. Only general
shopping center market areas were noted (i.e., San Francisco versus Memphis, as
opposed to researching median incomes of communities or actual market areas within
cities) [e.g., Gatzlaff, Sirmans and Diskin (1994); and Guidry and Sirmans (1993) (who
found that error variance was approximately proportional to shopping center size when
malls were in same city)].
The conclusion of lack of multicollinearity is based on variance inflation factors,
condition indices, and eigenvalue and tolerance limits procedures outlined by Belsley,
Kuh and Welsh (1980. A check was also made for outliers/influential observations using
the Belsley, Kuh and Welsh statistic DFFITS. Regression results were robust (i.e.,
outliers/influential observations deleted yielded comparable results).
Weighted least squares was applied using the standard practice of weighting by the
reciprocal of the variance of the observations’ error terms to stabilize the variance of e
and satisfy the regression assumption of homoscedasticity. A more involved but perhaps
better method would be to weight observations by the effective purchasing power of the
market area of the malls in which the stores are located (see, Gatzlaff, Sirmans and
Diskin, 1994).
Comparison shopping takes place more frequently at men’s apparel, jewelry, and the
men’s and women’s shoe stores than at other types of stores.
CENTER distances were normalized as follows: ((distance/square root of mall area) ⫻
1000)). VACA and SAME distances were overall much shorter and were not normalized.
One of the nine malls was triple level, not amenable to measurement, and so was
excluded [see Carter (1999) for further details].
Comparison of results with varying functional forms for the TRNT hedonic model is set
out in Carter (1999). It should be noted that the two models can be treated using
application of two-stage least squares. In the simultaneous equations the case is one of
over-identification, and SF and TRNT are assumed endogenous. Consequently,
improvement would be obtained by using a two-stage model. Initial two-stage least
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squares regression output showed estimates similar to those set out for both models. In
the present model, a weighted instrumental variable methodology was not employed nor
were the data transformed to properly apply the two-stage model (see Gatzlaff, Sirmans
and Diskin, 1994). The hedonic model for TRNT was improved after correction for
spatial autocorrelation in Carter and Haloupek (2000).
The results follow from interpreting the semi-log regression, having normalized distances
for CENTER.
This same effect of TRNT on SF and SF2 was found by Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans
(1992).
This was confirmed in Carter and Haloupek (2002) using the database described above
and a model utilizing the p-median problem. Results of store-type dispersion are
illustrated and explained on two dimensional maps of the shopping centers.
Variation in rent for each store type over distance was obtained by adding the coefficients
of the dummy variables to the intercept coefficient and the coefficient for CENTER. The
response curves are not actual bid rent or demand curves: ‘‘(T)he hedonic interpretation
of the gradient leads to further questions about the actual demand curve for location.
Hedonic functions are not demand (or supply) curves, and the demand for location has
not been calculated. That would require the instrumental variable estimation laid out in
Epple (1987) and elsewhere,’’ (Coulson, 1991).
T-ratios for interaction terms were all insignificant, so a main effects model was used.
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